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ABSTRACT
This thesis compares the efficacy of spectrum assignment and allocation using a
market-based system with the current government-controlled regulatory system. In
making this comparison, a brief review of the spectrum and its radio communication
uses is given. An examination of the current system-historical, organizational and
political-is also presented.
The spectrum is then discussed as a resource in relation to its economic character-
istics: supply, demand, opportunity costs, prices, externalities and property rights. Al-
though the spectrum is a unique resource as compared to most other natural resources,
this conclusion is no valid reason for not allowing the establishment of a spectrum
market exists.
An examination of how such a market might be established and operated, and the
implications of such a market are then discussed, with an example of how this market
would operate in the Land Mobile Radio Services. To better illustrate this point, a brief
history of land mobile radio, its technology and applications, and current allocation and
assignment mechanisms is also presented.
This study concludes by discussing the importance of the frequency spectrum to
economic growth, summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of both marketplace
and government regulation, and proposes that a market trial be instituted to test the
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only
lukewarm defenders in all those who profit by the new order.-N'iccolo Machiavelli,
The Prince
Man has discovered and learned, in less than a century, to utilize an amazing natural
resource: the radio frequency spectrum. In the early years of spectrum use, the primary7
limitations on exploiting the airwaves were technical naivety and lack of vision in de-
vising new applications. Neither of these restrictions now apply. The radio spectrum has
undergone intense scrutiny and study resulting in a thorough understanding of its tech-
nical characteristics and limitations and its position within the electromagnetic spectrum.
With our increased knowledge, we have extended the spectrum by enabling more
systems to occupy a band and, more significantly, developed systems which can operate
in previously unused bands. In fact, extensions of the useful spectrum at the upper limit
have increased the occupied spectrum by 200,000 times that which was originally known
to exist [Ref. 1: p. 175]. However, this has not always provided relief from congestion in
the airwaves. Along with technical advancement has come ever more numerous and in-
genious ways to occupy the spectrum, some of which consume spectrum space tens or
hundreds of times greater than ever anticipated. Also, new regions may possess technical
properties which make them unsuitable for existing services. These services must then
be crowded into usable bands. To congestion caused by technological sophistication can
be added congestion resulting from the inability or unwillingness to take full advantage
of this revolution. Incumbent users often have been reluctant or unable to bear the ex-
pense of investing in new technologies which work in higher frequencies.
Unfortunately, even if complete utilization of available frequencies was undertaken,
the spectrum is a limited resource. The ability to place an unlimited number of systems
in a limited spectrum is infeasible. Therefore it is important that the spectrum which is
allocated for use by the United States be used as efficiently as possible. When limited
availability of more conventional resources, such as water or forests, occurs, a program
of conservation is instituted or at least considered. This, of course, does not imply effi-
cient use of the resource, only that demand is constrained. Yet given the numerous uses
of the spectrum, current and unforeseen, any attempt at conservation must include the
efficient use of the airwaves, rather than constraints on demand only.
While this is an obvious and desirable goal, efficient use has different meanings and
objectives for different users of the spectrum. An engineer may define spectral efficiency
as utilizing the narrowest bandwidth possible to transmit an intelligible signal, regardless
of the technological costs. An incumbent user may define efficient use as the greatest
monetary return in relation to investment. Likewise, the general public, economists,
regulatory commissions and every other party interested in utilization will have a slightly
different view of spectral efficiency. As William J. Hilsman, President and Chief Execu-
tive Officer of the International Mobile Machines Corporation, stated. "Despite the ap-
parent obviousness of the idea of spectrum efficiency, there really is no common and
accepted yardstick that is used today, and this can lead to considerable confusion."
[Ref. 2]
While there is an intuitive awareness, or sense, of efficient use. some more concrete
description is needed in determining how the spectrum will be used and by whom. For
purposes of this discussion, efficient usage will be attained when the value gained by use
of a specific portion of the spectrum by one particular user cannot be increased by
transferring that spectrum from the incumbent to another user, whether for the same
purpose or a different one. "Set even with this definition there is uncertainty in what
constitutes value. Should value be measured in monetary terms, or perhaps in terms of
social value? The answer to this question will depend upon the judgment of the user, and
upon the situation and overall objective.
With this definition of efficiency, the question arises: which is the better method to
ensure efficient utilization of the spectrum, the current regulatory system or an as yet
untried marketplace mechanism? In seeking an answer, a brief review of the spectrum
and its radio communication uses will be presented in this introduction. Chapter II will
present the current regulatory system, viewed historically, organizationally and poli-
tically. Chapter III examines economic aspects of spectrum use. while Chapter IV at-
tempts to apply these concepts of market approaches to spectrum management. Chapter
V will show how the marketplace might work in one particular application, with con-
clusions and recommendations presented in Chapter VI.
A. DEFINING THE RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
The term spectrum refers to a class or group of similar entities arranged in the order
in which they possess a certain characteristic." [Ref. 3: p. 515] The electromagnetic
spectrum theoretically extends from zero to infinity and is composed of all the frequen-
cies which make up electromagnetic waves. These waves are formed of oscillating
electrical and magnetic energy, at right angles to each other, which travel at the speed
of light through free space.
Varying frequencies and lengths characterize electromagnetic waves. Frequency is
the number of waves (or cycles) which pass a specified point per second. The common
term for cycles per second is the hertz. Wave length is the distance a wave travels in one
cycle, or alternatively, the distance between the crests of a wave trough.
The portion of the electromagnetic spectrum which is regarded as the radio spectrum
(radio encompassing all forms of wireless communication) extends from very low fre-
quencies of a few kilohertz (thousands of cycles per second) and wavelengths of several
kilometers up to 300 gigahertz (billions of cycles per second) with wavelengths measured
in millimeters. The officially allocated radio spectrum lies between 10 kilohertz (KHz)
and 300 gigahertz (GHz).
The radio spectrum is considered to lie between these limits because of physical
constraints. Below 10 KHz, system components, especially antennas, become prohib-
itively large and expensive for commercial applications. Additionally, the usable band-
width below 10 KHz greatly restricts the amount of information which can be relayed
because of extremely slow transmission rates. Above 300 GHz, atmospheric elements,
such as oxygen molecules and water vapor, absorb the signal, rendering it unreliable for
information transfer.
Different portions of the spectrum have different geographic ranges and degrees of
transmission dependability. These are known as propagation characteristics. Generally,
the lower frequencies are used for long-distance communications and are the most de-
pendable, while the highest frequencies are reserved for short-range purposes and are
considered less dependable.
A single frequency is not adequate for transmitting information. Radio communi-
cations requires a range of frequencies. The range of these consecutive frequencies is
called bandwidth and is measured in hertz from the highest to the lowest frequency re-
quired. For example, a signal centered on the central, or carrier, frequency of 25
megahertz (MHz) with a bandwidth of 30 KHz would occupy the bandwidth between
24.97 and 25.03 MHz. This is also known as the emission bandwidth.
Weather, solar activity, the ionosphere, propagation medium (ground, sky, or space
wave) all affect the propagation of a wave. However, the effect of these on radio trans-
mission is a study in and of itself and will not be covered here.
Likewise, the effect of noise, or interference, on radio waves is a complex study,
with noise characterized as either internal or external. Internal noise is generated bv the
transmitter or receiver itself. External noise is produced by either natural radiation, in-
cidental man-made radiation, or out-of-band modulation radiation from other commu-
nication sources.
B. UTILIZING THE SPECTRUM
Utilization of the radio frequency spectrum requires the use of a system. A system
involves the use of transmitters, receivers, antennas and associated equipment, all coor-
dinated in order to achieve, at the minimum, a required signal-to-noise ratio with an
operating frequency. That is, the man-made signal must be greater than noise intro-
duced either internally or externally. In achieving this aim, the design of a system in-
volves trade-offs, such as the choice of frequencies, power and bandwidth to be utilized,
antenna directivity and sensitivity of the receiver to noise. High transmitter power
and or greater bandwidth is commonly used to overcome noise. However, there are
practical limits to the signal intensities which are achievable [Ref. 3: p. 517].
The measure of how well a system performs its function consists of both the volume
of information which can be transmitted during a specific time period and how accu-
rately the transmitted information can be reconstructed at a receiver [Ref. 4: p. 31]. In
order to transmit information, it is necessary to modulate the operating frequency of a
transmitter. That is, to impose the desired signal, whether analog (such as voice) or
digital (such as data), upon the radio frequency which is sent through the airwaves. This
is true regardless of the modulation technique used: amplitude, frequency, phase or any
other.
As mentioned earlier, this modulated signal will be composed of many frequencies
besides the carrier frequency, i.e., the bandwidth. Therefore, it is necessary to know
what the emission bandwidth of a signal is before assigning a bandwidth to a radio
communication service. Any emission outside an assigned bandwidth can produce in-
terference, in the form of noise, on other channels, degrading the performance of other
systems. Therefore, the elimination or minimization of emissions outside an assigned
bandwidth is an important aspect of optimum frequency utilization. Additionally, since
transmitter power for a given design determines the power level of interfering emissions,
power utilized should not be greater than that required to produce the desired grade of
service established for a system of service. [Ref. 3: p. 515]
With these considerations in mind, the designer and user of a system must also be
aware of the electromagnetic environment in which the system will operate. Besides the
presence of noise in the system's frequency range and minimization of interference
causing emissions, the effect of the earth's atmosphere on the radio frequency spectrum
must be considered.
C. COMMUNICATION USES OF THE SPECTRUM
Although there are non-communication uses of the spectrum, such as radio astron-
omy, this discussion focuses only on the spectrum utilized by the telecommunications
industry. Similarly, while electromagnetic waves used for telecommunications can be
sent from one location to another in transmission lines, waveguides, or through the at-
mosphere, atmospheric transmission will be discussed here since problems of interference
with radio frequency communications occur in atmospheric transmission.
1. Fixed
Fixed services are defined as, "A service of radio communication between spec-
ified fixed points." [Refs. 1: p. 127, 4 : p. 241] The word "specified" is used in order to
differentiate between fixed and broadcast services. A fixed service includes all radio
communication between established stationary communication points and through re-
lays along established communication routes. [Ref. 1: p. 128]
Fixed services are divided into parts, depending on the particular type of service,
such as aeronautical fixed, or depending on the user or service with which the fixed op-
eration is associated, such as marine relay. [Ref. 1: p. 128]
2. Mobile
Mobile service is defined as, "A service of radio communication between land
and mobile stations and between mobile stations." [Refs. 4: p. 215, 1: p. 130] While
both fixed and mobile services transmit signals which are intended to be received by
specific users, the fixed services' transmitters and receivers are at fixed sites, while mobile
operators may move their transmitters and receivers. Fixed and mobile services also
share another characteristic: similar suballocations to users and similar types of
emissions. [Ref. 1: p. 131]
The mobile services are subdivided into either maritime mobile, land mobile, or
aeronautical mobile.
3. Broadcast
A broadcast service is defined as, "A radio communication service in which the
transmissions are intended for direct reception by the general public." [Ref. 1: p. 133]
A broadcast service may include sound transmissions, television transmissions or other
types of transmissions. Flowever, auxiliary services, such as studio transmitter links,
remote pickup, and the like, are included under the fixed and mobile services for
allocation purposes. [Ref. 4: pp. 214-215]
Broadcasting is the most widely distributed radio service, and there can be no
doubt that it is the most important means of mass communication ever devised.
4. Other
A portion of the radio frequency spectrum is allocated to communication func-
tions which are not considered to be fixed, mobile or broadcast, such as the amateur
service. The amateur service, as the name implies, is devoted to self-training, intercom-
munication and technical investigations by authorized persons interested in radio tech-
nique solely for personal aims, with no financial benefit sought or expected [Ref. 4: p.
217]. Other radio communication services display a wide range of applications, such as
cordless phones, baby monitors and similar gadgets.
D. SUMMARY
As can be seen from this discussion, the spectrum has numerous and wide ranging
uses. It is this very fact which makes the spectrum such a valuable commodity, sought
after by many interests. Without some mechanism to ensure the allocation and assign-
ment of frequencies, the airwaves could easily dissolve into chaos. It is the task of rec-
onciling these differing uses of the spectrum which we know as frequency management.
For commercial applications in the United States, this job falls upon the Federal Com-
munications Commission.
II. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Federal regulation of the airwaves was instituted primarily to prevent interference
of the airwaves. A second objective of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
and its predecessors has been the prevention of congestion in the spectrum. While these
goals have been achieved to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the period or service
studied, the continued application of this system to the spectrum has increasingly been
questioned on economic grounds.
Before any exploration of alternate regulatory methods occurs, however, it is in-
structive to examine the history of regulation, the role of the FCC, and the institutions
which affect the FCC.
B. HISTORY OF REGULATION
The circumstances and history regarding regulation of the airwaves in the United
States have been recounted in numerous articles, books and digests [Refs. 5: pp. 16-24,
6 : pp. 424-429, 1: pp. 42-60, 7: pp. 100-102, 8: pp. 97-103, 9: pp. 656-658, 10: pp. 24-30].
The purpose in recounting it here is not to present new insights, but rather to briefly
provide an introduction into the conditions which fomented a regulatory system of
management.
Use of the spectrum began around the start of the Twentieth Century, primarily for
communications with sea-going vessels. Aside from naval forces, the other major user
of the airwaves at that time was amateur radio operators. When the amateur trans-
missions began interfering with U.S. naval communications, the U.S. Navy demanded
federal regulation to prevent this interference.
The direct consequence of this action was the Congressional Radio Act of 1912.
With this legislation, certain frequencies were delineated for commercial operators and
others for amateur operators. Additionally, all radio operators were required to obtain
a license from the Secretary of Commerce, the designated authority for accreditation.
In 1920, the first commercial radio station began broadcasting. Within a few years,
several hundred commercial stations were in existence and with them came piracy of the
airwaves, monopolistic conditions, offensive advertising, interference, and other unde-
sirable industry elements. To combat this situation, interference in particular, several
conferences were held in the early 1920s, without much impact upon use of the
spectrum.
Property rights were established in a de facto sense during this period and confirmed
in a 1926 Chicago court ruling. However, the federal government took steps to declare
the airwaves public property. The Radio Act of 1927 declared that the spectrum be-
longed to the public, and no property rights could be assumed by users. To manage this
public resource, the act created the five man Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and
empowered it to allocate frequencies, issue non-transferable broadcast licenses for a pe-
riod of three years, establish qualifications for broadcasters, set technical standards for
equipment, and determine hours of operation and transmitter power for stations. After
the establishment of the FRC, interference of the airwaves was significantly reduced.
The FRC held the power to grant, renew or revoke any broadcast license, until
Congress replaced it with the Federal Communications Commission in the Communi-
cations Act of 1934. Whereas the FRC had dealt primarily with the broadcast industry,
the FCC's power was extended to other communications methods, such as telephone
and telegraph. As far as the airwaves were concerned, the new act retained the basic
tenets established in the Radio Act of 1927. It is the act of 1934 which basically deter-
mines spectral use, even to this day.
C. ROLE OF THE FCC
The FCC is the agency which controls all civilian use of the spectrum. Federal use
of the airwaves is controlled by the Interdepartmental Radio and Advisory Committee
(IRAQ, which receives technical support from the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA). The International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) is the worldwide agency which provides overall rules for the utilization of the
spectrum and assigns different portions of the spectrum for designated uses. Therefore,
FCC (and IRAC) rules reflect the allocations made by the ITU.
The FCC is composed of seven members who are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate for seven-year terms. These commissioners hold jurisdiction
over all nongovernment spectrum such that no user (other than a federal agency) may-
occupy spectrum without the FCC's permission. Under the charter of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, as amended, the Commission regulates the radio communication
activities of all state and local governments, as well as the activities of private and
nonprofit broadcasters, communications common carriers, industry, transportation,
business, and other safety and special radio users.
The Executive branch of the government provides recommendations to the FCC as
to what should constitute U.S. regulatory policies. However, the Commission is under
no obligation to conform to these recommendations. The Commission regulates civilian
communications by a process of rule making. Once a policy decision is reached, the FCC
is also the agency required to implement and enforce the decisions. [Ref. 9: pp. 171-172]
The fundamental responsibilities of the FCC can be divided into three parts: allo-
cation, assignment and setting technical standards. In allocation, a block or band of
frequencies consisting of a number of channels is designated for the use of a particular
service, such as television or cellular phone. Assignment is the process of determining
which particular user will be granted the use of a portion of the spectrum allocated to a
designated service. The assignment process itself can be divided into two phases: user
classification by service and the actual selection of the user. In setting technical stand-
ards, the FCC is attempting to increase the overall utility of the spectrum by ensuring
efficient use and preventing spectral interference. This is accomplished by the
promulgation of detailed instructions to individual users concerning equipment parame-
ters, such as modulation techniques and harmonic emissions. Standards are set both to
limit out-of-band interference and also in-band interference. [Refs. 11: pp. II-3-II-4, 12:
p. 24, 13: pp. 4-7]
D. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
Political processes relating to spectrum regulation are just as important, if not more
so, than the administrative proceedings associated with regulatory control. Indeed, one
author has gone so far as to state that:
Communications in many respects has become politics, and politics has become
communications. Therefore communications policy is every bit as contentious, all-
encompassine, obscure and fast-changing as U.S. federal politics itself. [Ref. 14: p.
6]
Before the Commission makes significant policy changes, a political process as well
as an organizational and intellectual process occurs. Major players on the political side
of decisions include the Congress, President, courts, the regulated industries, Political
Action Committees, lawyers, and of course, the public.
1. Congress
Any major policy changes undertaken by the FCC are subject to congressional
scrutiny. In this process, both Houses, each with up to a dozen committees and sub-
committees granted communications policy oversight, have the capability to shape
spectrum management. Congressional spectrum management reflects, at least in part,
the public nature of the spectrum and recognizes that the spectrum possess unique
properties in furthering social, political, cultural, educational and recreational goals [Ref.
15: p. 35]. Congress wields influence over management policy by virtue of its ability to
revoke or overrule the Commission through law, the power to confirm or deny the ap-
pointment of commissioners advocated by the President, and most significantly, the
power of the purse strings. Congress controls the FCC's budget [Ref. 3: p. 77].
However, Congress, and even the public, tends to give the FCC only occasional
attention. Thus, it often fails to wield its jonsiderable power over the Commission. Ad-
ditionally, the diffuse interests of Congress, and again the public, tend to mitigate con-
trol over the Commission. [Ref. 3: p. 75]
2. The President
As stated before, one basis of presidential control in spectrum management
policy is the chief executive's authority to nominate commissioners to the FCC and
name the head commissioner. Congress has somewhat limited this power of appointment
by decreeing that no more than four members of the Commission may be of the Presi-
dent's political party. A second influence granted to the President over the FCC is the
ability "to make communications policy through channels which are competitive with
the FCC." [Ref. 3: p. 79]
3. The Judiciary
While the judicial system is not a policy making body, nor was it ever intended
to be, it does have an impact upon spectrum management. This occurs through the
process of interpreting statues and ruling upon the legality of cases brought before it.
The judiciary, although not subject to the same political lobbying process as Congress,
the President or the FCC, is nonetheless an arena for politics where different interests
seek vindication or a favorable policy ruling. [Ref. 16: p. 68]
4. The Telecommunications Industry
While Congress, the President and the public exert pressures upon the FCC, the
influence they bear pales in comparison to that wielded by the regulated industry itself.
Although this was not intended when the Commission was formed, this situation is ob-
vious for at least two reasons. First, unlike Congress and the public, the industry con-
centrates its attention on the actions of the Commission. Constant, informal contact
between the industry and the FCC often gives the industry significant influence over the
Commission. Second, Congress and the general public have exceedingly diffuse interests
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concerning utilization of the spectrum. The industry's interests are much more narrowly
focused (though not always coinciding).
Although the FCC was established to regulate the airwaves in the "public in-
terest," the inability to define this nebulous concept often leads to regulation based on
considerations which are only ascribed to public interest. In light of the influence in-
dustry exerts on the Commission, the public interest is often seen as being in the best
interest of the industry, or a compromise between industry and other stakeholders, such
as citizens groups. [Refs. 3: p. 75, 16: pp. 60-61]
Industry involvement in FCC policy making is also enhanced by the fact that
the industry is extremely wealthy and controls vast technological resources. Wealth en-
ables the industry to hire many former commissioners and their staff after leaving the
FCC, either within the industry or within law firms supporting the industry. "Of the 33
commissioners who left the FCC between 1945 and 1970, 21 went to work for the com-
munications industry or communications law firms." [Ref. 3: p. 74] Industry influence
also slows the implementation of spectrum technology. The industry is naturally inter-
ested in protecting technology which represents heavy investment. If the FCC protects
existing economic investment to satisfy the industry, as has been claimed, then it must
favor current systems, rather than promoting new systems however more technically
advanced. This protection continues until the industry itself seeks the change. [Ref. 3:
p. 75]
5. Political Action Committees
Another powerful influence acting upon the FCC is that of Political Action
Committees (PACs). Communications industry related PACs are among the richest
special interest groups in Washington. They are typically interested in preserving the
status quo of the industry. PACs often accomplish this end through the help of con-
gressional incumbents who are dependent upon the PACs for financial support.
Incumbents, obligated by money, often:
. . .fight changes in radio-band allocations and work to preserve the current division
of the radio market. They push for the retention of advantageous government sub-
sidies and close government regulation of competitors. [Ref. 17]
6. The Legal Community
Given the importance of the liaison between industry (including PACs), the
Commission and Congress, it is now easy to understand the role of attorneys in this
process. It is the lawyers who represent those organizations interested in influencing
management policy.
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Regulation, to a large extent, depends upon law school educated personages:
lawyer-politicians, lawyer-aides and lawyer-lobbyists. The reason for this is, for better
or worse, that regulatory law is communications law. Those most versed in its applica-
tion will be the most successful. However, there is one other aspect-the old adage that
it is not just what you know, but who you know. This can explain the large number of
former FCC employees who later work for either law firms or the industry, as mentioned
above. [Refs. 14: pp. 24-25, 3: p. 75]
E. CRITICISMS OF FCC MANAGEMENT
Critics of the FCC's ability to manage the spectrum are not shy in voicing their
points of view. An examination of these criticisms reflects one major point: inefficient
use of the spectrum. However, this criticism has many different aspects, depending upon
an author's particular concerns and point of view. Following are some of the more
common complaints.
Efficient use of the spectrum is hindered by the cost and delays of hearings, national
instead of regional allocation, restrictions on technically possible use and the treatment
of the spectrum as a "free good." [Refs. 11: pp. II-2-II-7, 18 : p. 1500]
That Commission hearings on spectrum use cause delays and are expensive to the
government is an obvious point. A review of the history of regulation shows instances
where years passed before the resolution of allocation hearings were finalized. As to the
cost of hearings, a House of Representatives Report accompanying House Resolution
2965, commonly called the Emerging Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1990,
provides an example of the monetary costs incurred in spectrum reallocation (the bill
proposes to move 200 MHz of the spectrum from government users to the FCC for
assignment):
The cost of such a change is highly uncertain, because it would depend on the choice
as to which portions of the spectrum would be reallocated. Costs to federal agencies
for property, equipment and facilities could total hundreds of millions of dollars-
though the DOC (Department of Commerce) and FCC presumably would seek to
minimize both cost and disruption in their selection of frequencies to be reallocated.
Other costs to the government would total about S3 million over the 1991-1995 pe-
riod, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. . . .Based on information
from the FCC, CBO (Congressional Budget Office) estimates that preparation of the
plan for distributing the specified frequencies would cost about S300,000 in both
1993 and 1994. Finally, it would cost the FCC about S50.000 in 1994 and SI 00,000
in 1995 to monitor the implementation of the distribution plan. [Ref. 19: pp. 9-10]
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From this estimate it can be deduced that the historical costs of FCC management
of the spectrum has been astronomical.
The problem with the current national allocation plan is that some bands are ex-
tensively used in specific areas of the country, and thus very valuable, while in other
areas the same bands have little or no use. For example, the Forestry Radio Service is
extensively used in rural timberlands and national parks, but of little use in urban areas.
However, under national allocation, those bands can not be used by overcrowded ser-
vices in urban areas, such as land mobile radio. Airwave characteristics and geograph-
ical separation would argue for regional allocation in some bands, to allow spectral reuse
or sharing. While national allocation was administratively simple when the practice was
instituted, its inflexibility in relation to today's spectrum needs contraindicate its con-
tinuation.
Inefficient use of the spectrum is also promoted by another licensing-allocation
practice, that of "first come, first served." The problem with first come, first served is that
it is often nearly impossible to reallocate the spectrum to take advantage of technolog-
ical advancements that would benefit spectrum utilization. As discussed earlier, this sit-
uation arises because of the political situation surrounding the FCC and the incumbents'
heavy equipment investments in the current band. The consequence is that new services
tend to be allocated bands which are not appropriate for those services. [Ref. 15: p. 55]
Restrictions on technically possible use, critics contend, also produce less intensive
or less profitable spectral use. This situation occurs because of the FCC's power to set
technical standards. Standards to prevent interference are based on the technology of
that era. Technical advances in spectrum saving equipment can and has made these
standards obsolete. For example, television and FM radio broadcasting areas were es-
tablished to prevent interference. However, because of technical advances, more stations
can now be added without interfering with the established broadcasters. Yet new stations
are not added, not because they would be unprofitable, but rather because current rules
prohibit new stations under older interference standards. Petitions to amend these rules
are quite expensive. [Ref. 11: p. II-7]
The "free good" aspect of spectrum management is a criticism exposed by many
economists. Under the current system, the cost of spectrum is zero. In other words, it is
a free good. This means there is usually no incentive to reduce equipment bandwidth
requirements since this would increase equipment costs. For certain industries, as long
as the spectrum is a free good, bandwidth will substitute for sophisticated technology.
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F. SUMMARY
The evolution of the telecommunications industry and government regulation, while
having a profound influence upon each other, have not proceeded apace.
The development and expansion of radio led to increasingly chaotic conditions early
in this century. This led to regulation of the airwaves, based upon the "public interest."
While this has and will continue to be difficult to define, it basically requires that the
communications industry provide efficient and responsive service to the public. This has
often meant the introduction of new technology. Herein lies the problem.
Regulation of the industry based on the technological knowledge and equipment at
a particular time is not necessarily the best regulation when technological innovation
and advancement occurs, especially when it occurs at a rapid rate. The inability of the
Commission to keep pace with technological improvements can not be blamed entirely
on the failure of the Commission to anticipate future needs and developments. The
communications industry itself has and continues to play a significant role in its own
regulation through the political process.
The shortcomings imposed by current spectrum management practices have been
the object of several reform proposals. These include organizational, managerial and
political improvements. However, the most sweeping proposals involve the use of market
forces. Before examining this significant change, it is useful to examine the economic
aspects of spectrum utilization.
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III. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECTRUM USE
A. INTRODUCTION
The frequency spectrum is a natural resource which is primarily valued for its social
contribution. While many other resources have social advantages-waterways and forests
for recreation, public land for minerals--they are also viewed with an eye towards eco-
nomic applications. Any non-economic use of such resources is always balanced by the
knowledge of opportunity costs foregone. [Ref. 15: p. 34]
Why is the frequency spectrum exempt from economic scrutiny? Is it that the spec-
trum does not share economic characteristics indigenous to other natural resources? The
answer to this must be no. While in some respects the airwaves are a unique resource,
the exclusion of the spectrum from economic analysis is not based upon any inherent
economic deficiencies. Social factors of spectrum use are currently seen as being more
important than economic ones.
But in denying spectrum a place in the public market, we fail to define the intimate
relationship between supply, demand and prices. The cost of supplying a good is the
value of other opportunities foregone by the conscious act of supplying that good over
another. That is, supply is based on opportunity costs. Demand is based on value to a
consumer. It is the interaction of these two factors which determines a market price.
Therefore, it is the market price which links the opportunity costs of the resource to its
value to consumers. When this relationship of opportunity costs to value is maintained,
a market is in equilibrium and supply will equal demand. However, the collapse of this
relationship results in a disequilibrium market where either supply or demand will be in
excess.
B. SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Scarcity in the radio frequency spectrum is evidenced by the fact that demand for
spectrum usually exceeds supply, though spectral scarcity does not exist across the entire
spectrum. Scarcity exists primarily in certain frequency bandwidths for specific uses of
a regional, geographic and economic nature. Technically or economically unusable re-
gions are not affected by the problem of scarcity. But in those bandwidths which are
exploitable, demand continues to grow as new uses are developed and old uses retained.
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1. Nature of the Resource
The primary economic value of the spectrum resides in its ability to transmit
various types of information over varying areas at differing rates in an intelligible man-
ner. Excessive demand creates interference, which leads to signal degradation, or in the
worst case, to an unintelligible signal. This devalues the spectrum, which eventually re-
aches zero when the signal is unrecognizable at the receiver. [Ref. 15 : p. 15]
That demand exceeds supply is not exclusive to the radio spectrum nor is de-
valuation of a resource by overuse restricted to the spectrum. However, unlike other
natural resources, the spectrum has some unique attributes:
• It is used, not consumed.
When the spectrum is not used, it is being wasted. In this respect, allowing
frequencies to lie fallow for intended future uses, given spectrum scarcity, is
wasteful. However, the extent of capital investment required for utilization of cur-
rently unoccupied spectrum could preclude future, more economical uses of that
spectrum, or a loss of current investment. In this respect, "hoarding" is econom-
ically rational and would be observed in a market setting.
• Dimensions of space, time and frequency are interrelated.
Different spaces, or geographical areas, can use the same frequency at the
same time, given enough separation. Similarly, the same space can use the same
frequency, given different times. Alternatively, the same space can use different




Spectrum is a resource available to all.
Given investment in the proper equipment, which ranges from the inex-
pensive to multimillion dollar systems, anyone can have access to the spectrum as
a sender and or receiver. For example, the purchaser of a twenty dollar transistor
AM/FM radio, the purchaser of a SI,000 stereo system and the purchaser of a
million dollar radio station each use the same portion of the spectrum, albeit for
different purposes.
The resource is wasted when it is used for tasks which are as easily done in other
ways.
Given spectrum scarcity, the use of substitutes, such as cable, fiber optics,
wire or waveguides, could be used to reduce demand on the spectrum. Alterna-
tively, while there are some arguments that there are always substitutes for the
spectrum, communications with moving vehicles such as ships, planes and motor
vehicles would be convoluted at best by the use of substitutes.
Spectrum is used inefficiently when its parameters are incorrectly applied.
Parameters in this instance refer to propagation characteristics of fre-
quencies within the spectrum. For instance, while AM frequencies between 550 and
1640 KHz are utilized for local broadcasting, the skywave characteristics of this
band at night causes signals to be transmitted far beyond a "local" area.
The resource is subject to pollution.
Pollution in this case refers to interference of the intended signal. This can
be caused by other signals, man-made electrical noise, or even cosmic or
metrological noise. [Ref. 4: pp. 4-6]
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The radio spectrum also differs from other natural resources in that it exhibits
characteristics of both "stock" and "flow" resources. [Ref. 15 : pp. 26-29]
The spectrum is a stock resource in that it is finite. The more which is used, or
occupied today, the less is available for use tomorrow. This is a general statement which
may be said to have many exceptions, but given the fact that intensive capital investment
for equipment is required to occupy the spectrum, enormous pressures are thereby cre-
ated to retain any particular portion of the spectrum to which an incumbent has gained
access. Therefore, there is less available for tomorrow. As stated earlier, although the
AM band is not particularly suited to local broadcasting, the investment in equipment
for that particular purpose on that band has precluded its use for other purposes. To
prevent such diseconomies as this in the future, the practice of stockpiling frequencies
has arisen.
The spectrum's attribute as a flow resource resides in the temporal nature of the
airwaves. The spectrum has a time aspect, much like the flow of a river. If water is not
drawn from the river at one time, the use of that particular water which has flowed past
is lost. However, different water is still available a moment later. So it is with the spec-
trum. Abstention from spectral occupancy at one moment causes the errant user to lose
the benefits which could have been derived at that time, but does not preclude future
benefits of occupancy. Also much like water, the spectrum displays the qualities of a
shared resource. Users have no incentive to refrain from using the resource, even to the
detriment of others. Without the assurance that others will not use the resource, denying
its optimum or desired use to the initial user at a future time, the initial user has no re-
course but to obtain the maximum benefit of the resource, regardless of whether he has
an immediate need.
Even among flow resources, however, the spectrum is unique. Depletion of this
resource requires no reinvestment for its maintenance. Once a signal ceases, the spec-
trum returns to its original state, on the condition that no other signal invades the va-
cated frequency. That is, this resource renews itself given the opportunity. However, the
opportunity of renewal should not be overestimated. Extensive investment in equipment,
the myriad uses of the spectrum and the possibility of non-intentional interference miti-
gate a return to a pristine state.
2. Extending the Supply
It is possible to either administratively or technologically expand the amount
of spectrum available, to a point. Administratively, the use of a particular portion of the
spectrum may be withdrawn from one user in order to give it to another. This does not,
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of course, expand the resource but it does extend the spectrum of a heavily used band-
width at the expense of a service which places a lesser demand on the spectrum. Obvi-
ously, this technique has limited applicability. [Ref. 12 : p. 51]
Technologically, the supply of spectrum may be extended on the "intensive" and
"extensive" margins. Expanding the intensive margin involves advances which allow
more users or services to occupy the same amount of spectrum than is currently done
today. Reducing equipment bandwidth requirements is an example. Expansion on the
extensive margin seeks to extend the total amount of spectrum available. The use of
higher and higher frequencies is an expansion of the spectrum on the extensive margin.
Expansion in either of these margins will account for more usable frequencies for more
users. [Ref. 15: pp. 15-16]
This does not mean, however, that there is an unlimited supply of the spectrum.
Eventually, a point is reached where it is no longer feasible to technologically reduce
frequency bandwidth and still retain an intelligible signal, nor is the spectrum infinitely
extendable.
3. Identifying Substitutes
In the strictest sense, every resource has substitutes. For the radio spectrum,
wire, cable, waveguides and fiber optics are obvious alternatives. Less apparent is that
people, storage spaces and motor vehicles are also substitutes. For example, mobile ra-
dio reduces the quantity of vehicles, drivers and fuel needed in trucking and taxi services
because of coordination efficiencies. Thus, spectrum can be replaced by the use of those
same resources.
Even in the field of broadcasting, significant substitutes have arisen in the form
of cable and videocassette recorders. While cable has long presented an alternative to
broadcasts in metropolitan areas, and indeed has surpassed the airwaves as the primary
method of delivering home entertainment, the past diseconomies of cabling rural areas
has kept broadcasting a viable option. However, even this last argument has lost ground
with the commercially successful cabling of Montana. [Ref. 20 ]
These insights recognized, the true test of the suitability of a substitute is based
on economic rather than technological grounds. The exception is when the issue is re-
lated to safety—maritime, police, fire, etc.-where the use of spectrum is adjudged ap-
propriate on social and political grounds, rather than economic. The test must ascertain
if the cost of a substitute is less than that of the original resource. Although it is difficult
to quantify costs in most cases, the fact remains that substitutes are available which
satisfice to varying degrees.
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Yet the user is at a disadvantage: he is not allowed to strike a balance between
spectrum and its substitutes. A lack of price incentives prevents the creation of an opti-
mum balance. [Ref. 15: p. 25]
4. Optimal Allocation
One measure of optimal allocation is when productive factors are distributed
so that the marginal value of productivity of all ends is equal. Thus any change in as-
signment will not increase economic value.
A better mechanism for identifying efficient, or optimal, allocation of the spec-
trum is to determine whether the benefit gained from any reallocation is greater than the
benefit lost as a consequence. If this is the case, then the resource was not optimally
allocated. However, to make this type of efficiency judgment requires some objective
measure of value. If some standard of value were common, such as monetary or social
value, it would be a relatively simple matter to determine optimal allocation by identi-
fying the greater benefit. However, in the absence of such common values, the process
is exceedingly difficult.
Therefore, perhaps a better mechanism for identifying efficient allocation with-
out a value-based system would be to determine whether any reallocation of the spec-
trum benefits one spectrum user at the expense of another user. Using this measure of
optimal allocation, it can be said that some spectral bands, such as mobile land radio.
are efficiently allocated. Spectral scarcity is such that moving frequencies from one user
to another benefits the new user at the expense of the former user. However, this same
argument, if used with the television industry, would show inefficient allocation. Unused
TV bands if transferred to mobile radio would greatly benefit that industry without af-
fecting television if the frequencies reallocated were used in the same geographic area
and had sufficient separation from bands in use so as not to cause interference. Similarly,
unused frequencies held by the government for future allocation are not being efficiently
used, unless the bands are currently technologically unusable. Unusable frequencies do
not meet this criteria since even if they are assigned, they do not benefit the new user
and their allocation is not detrimental to the former holder.
However, given a value market, if the economic input of one service is less than
that of another, then a change would certainly be in order. If the financial benefits of
mobile radio in a given area outweigh its pre-emption by broadcasting, then spectrum
should be reallocated. This, of course, necessitates a financial definition only, undoubted
by social concerns. But, it does illustrate the difficulty in determining an "objective"
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definition of most "valuable" use. A market would have no such difficulty. The highest
bidder would have the greatest monetary return on investment.
C. OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND PRICES
The economist defines the opportunity cost of any resource as the measured differ-
ence of its use for one particular purpose in lieu of its next best alternative use. Using
the frequency spectrum as the input to production, the problem is to determine the op-
portunity cost of using a frequency or band of frequencies for a particular purpose.
The opportunity cost of spectrum will depend upon the amount of bandwidth used,
area covered by the signal and the length of transmission time. Additional factors include
technological aspects, such as the suitability of the frequency for its intended use, and
the size of the population in the area which the signal is intended to reach. The difficulty
in measuring many of these variables often leads to the conclusion it is impossible to
place a price on the spectrum, at least a price based only on opportunity costs. [Ref.
21: p. 66]
However, a price derived within a market does not have the same complication. It
is not necessary to identify opportunity costs to in order to set a price.Without the re-
quirement to establish opportunity costs in order to set a price, the market relationship
between supply and the cost of suppling remains intact.
1. Costs of Free Spectrum
If, as is the current situation, a service does not pay for spectrum used, there is
no incentive to adopt a system design which uses the least possible amount of spectrum.
Rather, there are incentives to use more spectrum so that the system may use fewer re-
sources in areas for which the user is charged. For example, given two specific spectrum
uses, one designer may utilize more spectrum in order to save money on the transmitter
or receiver by utilizing simpler, and hence less expensive, technologies. Extending this
analogy, it is obvious that the total amount of spectrum needed will eventually exceed
the spectrum available. At that point, one or both users must adopt spectrum saving
designs, accept substitutes, or exit the industry. If spectrum saving designs are adopted
as a strategy, then:
The opportunity cost of the spectrum to the first system is the cost saving that the
second system obtains if a small amount of spectrum were transferred to it. A sym-
metric definition applies to the second system, and it can be shown that the eco-
nomically efficient designs for both systems occur when their respective opportunity
costs are equal. [Ref. 11: pp. II-13-II-15]
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A second facet of an essentially free spectrum is that because users have been
able to obtain spectrum at no cost, paying only nominal licensing fees, no incentive ex-
ists not to horde more spectrum than is currently needed. The rationale being that at
some future time, the bandvvidths may be needed. It is better to obtain and retain unused
spectrum than to allow others to gain control of them. [Ref. 21: p. 65]
This behavior is exemplified by the television industry. Whereas the FCC has
allocated 82 channels (bandwidths) to television, only a small fraction of that number
are in use at any particular geographic location. Yet the industry has successfully lobbied
for years to retain all bands even in the face of spectral scarcity by other users in the
same bands (land mobile radio for example). Only recently has the television industry
stated a need for this unused spectrum. The industry now claims those bands will be
needed when High Definition Television (HDTV) is introduced in the U.S. That event
is expected to occur before the turn of the century (the FCC intends to announce in-
dustry7 standards mid- 1993). Prior to the advent of HDTV, the industry had retained
large portions of the spectrum for no other reason than that it was costless to them, re-
gardless of the opportunity costs to others.
This does not imply that nonuse of spectrum is always wasteful. Vast portions
of the spectrum are currently unused because of technological constraints, upper
portions of the gigahertz range being an example. In this sense, portions of the unused
spectrum are not being wasted. The spectrum is wasted only when potential users exist
and are excluded.
2. Distortion by Price
Prices are an essential element in coordinating the users' demand to scarcity.
The cost of a good compels us to weigh the economic value to alternatives against the
cost of obtaining the primary resource. It is in this way that we make choices which are
most beneficial to ourselves.
Since there is no price associated with spectrum use, or non-use, there is no in-
centive to utilize spectrum saving technology. As a rule of thumb, the more efficient a
system is in utilizing spectrum, the more expensive is the technology used in building
that system.
This is not to imply that the use of sophisticated equipment in and of itself
should be the only criteria associated with determining who should have use of the
spectrum and the amount that they should have access to. An approach such as this
merely replaces associated spectrum opportunity costs with the substitution costs of
other resources, such as technoloeical innovation. This is the substitution of one
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resource for another, and may fail to remedy total opportunity cost of all inputs. [Ref.
11: pp. 11-13-11-15]
Therefore, more efficient technology should only be used if the economic bene-
fits of the technology outweigh the costs associated with using it. However, as long as
prices are disassociated from spectrum use, current users will have no incentive to invest
in frequency saving technology even when economic benefits justify higher costs for
equipment.
D. RECOGNIZING EXTERNALITIES
Consequences of an action not taken into account when making a decision are
known as externalities. The consequences may be either beneficial, harmful, or, as is
usually the case, a combination of both.
Beneficial externalities of spectrum use are easily recognizable. Safety of water, air
and surface travel is greatly enhanced through the use of navigational and activity-
coordinating radio frequencies—an obvious benefit, though not necessarily the primary
goal. Positive externalities include national and international connectivity, and a host
of other obvious advantages.
Against beneficial externalities must be balanced negative externalities. These are
more difficult to address, but are more important in establishing the economic viability
of the spectrum. The costs of using the airwaves must account for costs incurred by the
use of that spectrum, especially since no price is associated with it.
Major negative externalities of the spectrum may be divided into three classes:
propagation uncertainty, restriction of a signal, and complex interference. Propagation
uncertainty defines the inability to ensure that a transmitted waveform will retain the
characteristics of its intended form. An example is afforded by a local AM broadcast.
For this purpose, the signal is transmitted as a ground wave. However, because of
ionospheric differences between day and night, a ground wave during the day may be-
come a sky wave at night. This extends the range of the signal far beyond its intended
area, unless other factors (specifically power) are changed.
This is related to the second major externality, restriction of the signal, although not
in the same manner. With current technology--which is unlikely to change significantly
in the future—it is impossible to confine a signal to a precisely defined geographic area
or to create a situation where a signal stops propagating once it passes its intended re-
ceiver. In one sense, this may be considered a benefit for use of the spectrum. But, as is
usually the case, the inability to restrict a sisnal results in interference to other sisnals
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because of frequency compatibility or compatibility of some harmonics of a signal with
the interfered signal. The use of directive antennas can mitigate, but not eliminate, this
problem.
The third major externality, complex interference, is the interference between two
different frequencies whose transmitters are located in the same place. These frequencies
do not interact until a third, different frequency begins radiating from a transmitter in
the same location. Each externality alone, and especially in combination, must be ad-
dressed before a viable market for spectrum can be developed. [Ref. 12: pp. 69-72]
E. OBSTACLES TO PROPERTY RIGHTS
While defining negative externalities presents problems in establishing a market, an
even greater obstacle is presented by property rights. Property rights may be broadly
defined as the legal justification given to an owner of a resource or good to dispose of
that resource in the best benefit of that owner. That is, no imposition should be placed
upon an owner as to retaining, selling or leasing of that good. While property rights have
traditionally been associated with such resources as land, water, and the goods taken
from them, the spectrum presents a unique case.
From soon after its discovery, the spectrum has been declared the property of the
people, a public resource. Therefore it cannot be owned by a specific person or organ-
ization and no property rights have been associated with it. Just as the majority of the
public would be loath to sell Yosemite National Park because of its special attributes,
this same feeling does not extend to the majority of land in the United States. Reluc-
tance to relinquish the public property rights to Yosemite to a single person or organ-
ization also extends to the spectrum because of its special attributes.
However, until property rights for the spectrum are defined, the establishment of a
market is not viable, and without a market there is no assurance that a resource is being
employed in its best value. For the essence of property rights is the ability to transfer
those rights to those who value them most--for a price.
F. CONCLUSION
The frequency spectrum displays economic characteristics of other natural re-
sources, yet has unique differences. These differences are not so great or so unusual to
economic theory, however, as to preclude the development of a market which will es-
tablish costs and prices for the spectrum. Once this is done, supply and demand will
reach an equilibrium promoting economic efficiency which now does not exist.
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The primary deterrent to this objective is the lack of a coherent definition of prop-
erty rights. There are serious obstacles to overcome in its definition, but these are
surmountable-once negative externalities have been mitigated.
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IV. MOVING TOWARDS A MARKETPLACE FOR THE SPECTRUM
A. INTRODUCTION
Currently, no market for the spectrum exists. The closest approach to it is a market
for technological assets, such as broadcasting facilities. While it often appears that pur-
chase of the equipment carries with it the right of radiation, this is not a viable spectrum
market.
The establishment of a marketplace for the spectrum will be a difficult task for a
variety of reasons: resistance to paying for what is now free, social concerns, political
pressures and the general difficulties of defining a market.
However, there are some means to reduce these obstacles. Political and practical
objections could be mitigated if a market was close to the current system. Likewise, any
system must be responsive not only to economic concerns but also to social concerns.
Lastly, the market should allocate spectrum to those who most efficiently use it, not just
to those most able to purchase it. [Ref. 15: p. 87]
B. MITIGATING MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
1. Negative Externalities
As explained earlier, negative externalities can be broadly grouped in one of
three categories: propagation uncertainty, signal restriction and complex interference.
Only when the effects of negative externalities, alone and in conjunction, are mitigated
will a viable spectrum market be possible.
While this is a straightforward statement of the problem, its resolution is not
simple. Propagation uncertainty can never be entirely eliminated. Such is the nature of
the beast. However, selection of a frequency bandwidth whose characteristics are most
suited to the task at hand can moderate the effects of uncertainty. For example, local
broadcasts would tend to remain localized if FM instead of AM bands were employed
for the purpose.
Restriction of a signal to an area and complex interference similarly are not
easily solved. Various schemes have been proposed for signal restriction. The most
workable of these plans in terms of legal and economic viability involve either defining
the inputs to radiation (time, power and antenna height directivity), or measuring the
strength of a signal at a given distance. Likewise, negating the effects of complex inter-
ference has no one perfect solution. The central problem is deciding exactly which
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component of which system is creating the interference. The simplest answer is that the
last system which radiates before the problem appears is the cause of the interference.
Several options are available to correct the situation. Changing frequencies, better
insulation of equipment, or reimbursements to others for tolerating the interference are
feasible solutions. [Ref. 18: pp. 1519-1529]
Basically, what is being described in these solutions is a method of frequency
coordination aimed at eliminating or lessening the effects of interference. Currently this
is the goal of the FCC since there is no other mechanism for attaining these ends. These
proposals attempt to establish an economic basis for removing the causes of interfer-
ence. The liability for interference is to be borne by the rights-holder of the cause of the
interference. Interference raises the total cost of the system by requiring compensatory
payments to rights-holders of systems which are being interfered with. Thus, when the
cost of modifying the offending system is less than the cost of punitive damages to other
systems, the offender will seek to invest in innovations which increase the economic
benefit of the system. Thus, spectral efficiency is enhanced, not through governmental
involvement, but through the marketplace.
If a rights-holder of a portion of the spectrum is expected to sustain the liabil-
ities associated with negative externalities, then the benefits that accrue from ownership
should also be his. Until property rights are defined, this will not be the case.
2. Property Rights
There are difficulties in defining rights. Utilization of the frequency is not an
absolute science. The energy of a signal is subject to many variables—water vapor, rain,
the sun--which can affect its strength negatively or positively. Noise, either natural or
man-made, can also affect the quality of a signal. The ill-defined nature of signal prop-
agation thus argues against the establishment of property rights, as opposed to defining
rights of more tangible goods.
Yet at least four conditions have been proposed as necessary for the establish-
ment of spectrum property rights: emission rights, admission rights, use rights and rights
of transferability. Emission rights refer to the justification of using a frequency with
clearly recognized characteristics, such as whether a band is suitable for long or short
range transmission. The next condition is the ability to refuse spectrum admission to
another whose use could cause interference. Both of these depend upon the next right,
the ability to choose the bandwidth which best satisfies the need for which spectrum is
desired. Last, and most important, is the capability to transfer rights of emission and
admission to others. [Ref. 22: p. 232]
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These conditions are not absolute and may be exchanged by other concepts,
such as defining rights as a relationship between time, area, space and frequency com-
patibility [Ref. 18: p. 1501]. Others have advocated using the technical characteristics of
the transmitting equipment to define rights associated with the spectrum [Ref. 4: pp.
209-210]. Several alternative proposals exist, but either share similar arguments to the
proposals already outlined or are vaguely defined [Ref. 12: pp. 64-69].
Potential problems of defining property rights exist in all proposal concepts be-
cause of costs involved in latitude or enforcing these rights. Given these difficulties, any
definition of rights may seem to be a hopeless cause. Yet until some definition concern-
ing property rights is defined and accepted, no market can be established. The question
should not be which is the best proposal, but rather what is a workable proposal which
can be the basis for refinement. If this seems to be an arbitrary decision, recall that rights
currently associated with tangible resources, such as land or water, were not established
overnight. From some mutually agreeable starting point-some centuries old-these
rights have evolved into their current forms. The spectrum can benefit by the same
process.
Part of this process will be the determination of the time period for which these
rights will be granted. That is, should rights be granted in perpetuity or for a limited
period? Additionally, what latitude will be granted for transferability of rights associated
with the spectrum? Any market proposal must grant an "owner" the ability to transfer
all associated rights, otherwise economic incentives for efficient occupancy of the spec-
trum will not exist. As for the period of occupancy, the federal government's policy on
oil leases offers one sensible example. In federal oil leases, the purchaser of the rights
maintains control for as long as the resource (oil) is being exploited, either through ex-
ploration or actual pumping of petroleum. A lease expires when the resource is not used.
The extension of this policy to spectrum occupancy is obvious.
However, if a market exists with transferability, then a period of occupancy
wouldn't be needed. As long as spectrum is transferable, owners would not allow it to
go unused. Rather, they would sell or lease the spectrum.
Once rights are established, the problem then becomes one of assigning and al-
locating the spectrum.
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C. ALLOCATING AND ASSIGNING THE SPECTRUM
Allocation is the process whereby various parts of the spectrum are designated for
use. This is in contrast to assignment, which is the process in which allocated bands are
dispensed to an individual or organization.
Traditionally, the objective of spectrum management has been to allocate spectrum
so that the amount of spectrum allocated reflects the value of the service for which it is
to be used [Ref. 13: p. 8]. Unfortunately, this often does not take into account changing
needs and the priorities of established and potential users. The second aspect of spec-
trum management, assignment, while sometimes using the criteria of social needs, all too
often actually employs the precept of first come, first served. Yet regardless of the
mechanism of distribution, under the current system the rapid pace of technological ad-
vancement in spectral equipment is not adequately recognized or utilized.
In contrast to FCC allocation and assignment, several other mechanisms have been
proposed to serve the same function within a marketplace: charges or fees, auctions and
lotteries. To a greater or lesser extent, these proposals could replace some or all of the
restrictions currently imposed by the FCC: type of use, class of user, system design and
spectrum loading.
But before discussing these means, the problem of what to do with current spectrum
users or holders must be addressed. It has been suggested that to create a full-fledged
market, it is only necessary to invest current spectrum users with the property rights
discussed above. Outright ownership would create incentives to sell spectrum for profit
and provide a method for acquiring more spectrum from those willing to sell. Addi-
tionally, this course of action might reduce the resistance of current holders to the in-
stituting of a spectral market. However, this policy would most likely increase resistance
to change by those who do not currently occupy the spectrum. [Refs. 13: p. 16, 15: pp.
88-89]
Arguments can be made for either position, but once again, it is more important to
decide upon a course of action than to delay implementation of a market because of
differences in perspective.
Compromise between both positions is a possibility, but current users would seem
to have the edge since occupancy can be seen as having established some rights through
usage. If the opposite viewpoint prevails, then charges, fees, auctions or lotteries could
be used to allocate and assign the spectrum. Additionally, any spectrum currently not
allocated or assigned would use one, or a combination of, these methods when that
spectrum was opened for use.
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1. Charges and Fees
The idea behind charges or fees is to establish total or partial value of the
spectrum. Fees are suitable for either the allocation or assignment process, or both.
However, if used only for assignment, none of the four restrictions currently adminis-
tered by the FCC would necessarily be affected. Using fees for allocation would affect
these restrictions. A charge placed on a specified band would be allocated to any service
willing to pay the fee, with or without conditions of use regarding the four restrictions.
Revenue produced by charges or fees could then be claimed by the government, and
should help promote economic efficiency. [Ref. 23: p. 13]
However, it is not necessary that all charges or fees be collected by the govern-
ment. At the opposite pole, all fees could be paid between competing users. Any new-
comer could reimburse an incumbent for costs associated in vacating, sharing or lending
spectrum for the benefit of the newcomer. This does not mean than an incumbent must
automatically accommodate any and all newcomers. The incumbent would have the
option to refuse use of the spectrum to newcomers. In this case the incumbent would
be forced to recognize the opportunity costs of the spectrum held: the value of the
spectrum to the incumbent as opposed to the value of that spectrum to the newcomer.
If the value held by the newcomer is greater than that of the incumbent, then the ex-
pectation is that the incumbent would accommodate the newcomer. This is in contrast
to the present system where a newcomer must choose between developing a new system
in an unused band, using substitutes for radio, or attempting to administratively share,
borrow, or preempt spectrum from an incumbent through hearings before the FCC.
Newcomers would now have the option to share a portion of the spectrum with
an incumbent. This could have the added benefit of increasing efficient use of the spec-
trum. Inefficient spectrum use is fostered by a paucity of users: inexpensive spectrum
substitutes for expensive equipment. With charges imposed, the opportunity cost of the
spectrum will be realized and technically efficient use of the spectrum will be fostered,
as long as investment in equipment is less expensive than the costs of excluding new-
comers. Likewise, newcomers would choose to invest in new technology as long as it cost
less than sharing or preempting spectrum of an incumbent. [Ref. 24: pp. 346-347]
Between these two extremes, any percentage of charges could be assigned to the
government with the remainder paid to incumbents for renting or vacating a portion of
the spectrum.
Numerous proposals have been advocated for use in determining fees, each at-
tempting to determine the correct price for promoting economic efficiency. Establishing
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the "correct" price for the spectrum is seen as a major drawback in a fees systems. The
determination of a formula for each industry using the spectrum, in order to establish
fair fees, is the difficulty. [Ref. 11: pp. I V-17-I V-21]. This drawback suffers from using a
cost based rather than a market based pricing scheme. Given the many factors necessary
to establish a price based on costs, it would be practically impossible to set fair standards
for all industries with competing uses. However, these defects would not appear in a
market based scheme, since there is only one price. That is the price where supply equals
demand, for whatever industry or use.
2. Auctions
Related to the use of fees is the establishment of an auction. An auction could
be used to allocate a band to a specific service. As an assignment process, it would be
used to choose between competing claimants. The advantage of an auction would be to
eliminate the need for administrative hearings designed to determine use of the spectrum
among numerous mutually exclusive yet similar applicants. The basis for an auction
being that the user valuing the spectrum most will bid the most. Thus, determination of
the price of a channel within the spectrum allocated would be determined by the market,
which in turn would be influenced by the amount of spectrum allocated for assignment.
Like fees, auctions could possibly eliminate some or all of the FCC restrictions, de-
pending upon employment, and could produce government revenue. [Ref. 23: pp. 11-13]
The determination of whether to use an auction or a fee, or some combination,
for allocation and assignment must be made only after deciding what the desired final
state should be. Each system possesses different properties which will produce different
outcomes regarding the structure of a spectrum market, such as the length of time over
which spectral property rights may be exercised, willingness to introduce technical in-
novations and the ability of the government instead of private enterprise to generate
revenues. It is not necessary that all services utilize the same system, but once a decision
is reached, it must be a long term commitment if benefits are to be realized.
3. Lotteries
Lotteries are not an unexplored method for assigning spectrum. When the FCC
has been swamped by spectrum requests initiated by emerging technologies (cellular
phone being one example), it has used a lottery system because of inadequate adminis-
trative resources. Lotteries reduce administrative costs by consciously refusing to dis-
criminate between applicants.
This is not to imply that the mechanism of the lottery is a particularly suitable
method for assigning the spectrum. Indeed, abuses invited by this system have led to its
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virtual demise as an assignment tool. Lotteries tend to degenerate into a gamble for
anyone who can furnish the necessary documentation. For a small investment, a winner
gains control of a portion of a very valuable resource which can then be subsequently
disposed of at an enormous profit. Lotteries provide an incentive to increase the number
of applicants, thus exacerbating the original problem they were meant to solve. The true
significance of the lottery is that it is an admission that some assignment mechanism,
other than the current FCC administrative process, is necessary, at least in some cases.
D. MARKET IMPLICATIONS
An overriding characteristic of a market is the expression of individual preferences.
This is not evident in any other system. A market provides information about accumu-
lated private preferences based on demand. This is in contrast to an expression of "need."
Need does not take into account relative alternatives, whereas demand does. While there
may be a relationship between need and demand, in a market system the subjective
concept of need is always subordinate to the more objective concept of demand. A
market is only concerned with those who are willing to forego alternatives based upon
a price system. [Ref. 10: pp. 47-50]
The establishment of any market is influenced by two fundamental philosophies:
competitive and monopolistic ideologies. Spectrum markets are no exception. The
monopolistic view of spectrum use stresses that strict control leads to optimum utiliza-
tion. Duplication of equipment is eliminated, thus ensuring demand does not exceed
supply. Likewise, frequency coordination is more easily achieved within a single organ-
ization. Alternatively, in the case of radio frequencies, the competitive position is re-
presented by regulated competition. Administration of the spectrum is handled by a
governmental body which seeks to attain the same ends as a monopolistic enterprise
would: allocation, assignment and engineering standards. Neither system can be said to
be superior to the other in every respect, each having benefits in unique situations.
Therefore, the main difference is not in how the spectrum is utilized by an individual,
but rather the number of individuals who are allowed to utilize the spectrum. Competi-
tion will tend to favor utilization of the spectrum by more users, leading to diverse allo-
cation based on popular demand. Monopolization allows fewer users but a potentially
more economic use. [Ref. 1: pp. 190-193]
1. Monopolies
It is feasible that the establishment of a market system could create a spectral
monopoly once rights are transferable. If the cost of spectrum service provides an
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incentive for the establishment of a natural monopoly because of economies of scale,
then it would definitely be in the economic interest of some company to monopolize a
band in order to reap a greater profit through lower costs. After all, monopolies are
established for the sake of profit, not for the sake of establishing a monopoly. As indi-
cated above, this could be the most efficient method of providing a service. However,
if this should be the case, then that firm should face regulation just as with any other
natural monopoly. [Ref. 13: p. 18]
2. Free Market
The essence of spectrum management in a free market is that an individual has
complete control over the uses to which the airwaves are put, within confines of the law.
The reason for this is the belief that individual producers and consumers will make de-
cisions more capably than a bureaucratic process regarding efficient use of the spectrum.
Decisions on type of use, class of user, system design and spectrum loading
which are currently made by the FCC would now rest with individual users, after fre-
quency rights were defined. While it could be argued that this would result in a chaotic
situation, if property rights have been adequately defined, interference should not occur
or would be of short duration and settled by litigation.
Users seeking access to bands outside those assigned would be free to enter into
discussions with holders of desired bands, or similarly, seek to change coverage area
within the same band. This could well mean that some users would find it more profit-
able to sell their rights to other users rather than use the airwaves for the purpose ori-
ginally intended. Eventually, an equilibrium should be reached wherein all users are
satisfied with the spectral distribution. However, this does not imply that this system
would initially provide a quicker or less costly method of allocation and assignment than
through an administrative process. The question of the length of time it would take the
market to reach an equilibrium and whether transaction costs would be prohibitive still
remain. [Ref. 23: pp. 7-8]
3. Hybrid Markets
A hybrid market attempts to combine elements of a free market with current
administrative methods. There are several approaches to a hybrid market. Some pro-
posals are based on fee and auction mechanisms. Others take different tacks. [Ref. 23:
pp. 9-10]
A simple hybrid approach is frequency coordination. In this system, potential
new users must determine whether their entrance into the spectrum will cause interfer-
ence with any established user's system. If interference is proven, then the new user must
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bear the cost of modifying his or the incumbent's equipment. If the new user cannot
mitigate interference to established systems, then permission to use the spectrum is de-
nied. However, since it is the new user who must bear all costs of admission, even to the
point of upgrading an incumbent's equipment, permission to operate is generally not
seen as a problem. A newcomer will cease attempting entry when the cost of admission
exceeds the economic return expected from use of the spectrum.
Another hybrid approach is represented by band assignment. In this mech-
anism, an allocated band, such as mobile radio, is divided into sub-bands which are then
assigned to individuals or groups. The difference is no in-band technical requirements
would be imposed. The users would have the freedom to define modulation techniques,
signal strength, channelization and antenna characteristics. However, the user would be
required to adhere to interference standards established by property rights. Initial as-
signment could be made to current holders, or a lottery or auction used. Several different
versions of this technique exist utilizing various proportions of free market and admin-
istrative processes.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Although the establishment of a spectrum marketplace would be initially difficult
and entail considerable confusion, there are no overriding social, political, or economic
reasons preventing implementation. Negative externalities and problems posed by un-
defined property rights do have solutions, albeit imperfect. However, there is no perfect
solution in the foreseeable future. Therefore, if a market is to be established, one of the
systems proposed to mitigate externalities and define property rights must be adopted.
Depending upon the desired objective of a spectral market, numerous mechanisms exist
to allocate and assign bands and channels. Likewise, the type of market desired may in-
fluence allocation and assignment, and will determine the extent of administrative influ-
ence found in the market.
No one method can be said to be best, nor is it necessary that the same system be
used across the entire spectrum.
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V. LAND MOBILE RADIO
A. INTRODUCTION
Land mobile radio denotes a conglomeration of various communications services.
These services include police and fire use; dispatching gas, telephone and public utility
crews; dispatching taxis, buses, trucks and the like; railroad operation; remote control
of machines and industrial processes; and alerting individuals through the use of pagers.
[Ref. 25: p. 49]
Land mobile is divided into several service categories based upon message charac-
teristics, number of common channels, and the nature and purpose of the system. These
categories include public and private land mobile systems. Public services, as the name
implies, are open to the general public, such as paging systems and cellular phone. Pri-
vate land mobile is restricted to users who regularly interact via radio communications,
such as taxi companies. [Ref. 9: p. 284]
The benefits accruing from the use of mobile radio are incalculable in terms of safety
provided to life and limb. In more easily quantifiable areas, such as speedier business
service, lower manufacturing costs, and improved manufacturing and transportation
operations, the cost savings are enormous. It is for this reason that land mobile has be-
come an essential part of U.S. economic vitality. It is as important to economic growth
as roads, rails, waterways, and other components of the U.S. infrastructure. Given the
dynamic pace of our economy, mobile radio is an excellent method to provide the rapid,
reliable and close control and supervision required in a modern industrial society.
B. HISTORY OF THE LAND MOBILE RADIO SERVICE
Regulation of land mobile by the FCC is a particularly interesting history for a
number of reasons. Land mobile services have evolved through a series of difficult allo-
cation decisions involving a scarce resource desired by numerous users. These decisions
have had extended consequences relating to the service. FCC actions have also influ-
enced the communications industry structure. Lastly, the expense and delays in intro-
ducing new land mobile radio technology has often been cited as evidence that the FCC,
as currently organized, is not the optimum mechanism for dealing with the spectrum.
[Ref. 3: p. 106]
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The history of the Land Mobile Radio Service can be found in several texts, offering
general agreement and diverging only in the extent of particulars [Refs. 9: pp. 291-292,
3: pp. 107-110, 10: B 1-B 51]
General agreement starts the story of land mobile with the Detroit Police Depart-
ment. If not the first, it was certainly among the first users of land mobile radio with the
establishment of an experimental one-way (base-to-car) system in the early 1920s. The
advantages gained by that department led other police departments to install similar
systems. By 1930, police radio stations were operating in 29 other cities. In the early
1930s, the Federal Radio Commission (predecessor to the FCC), allocated frequencies
above the broadcast band for police use.
In 1932, two-way communications became a reality when transmitters were licensed
for installation in vehicles, at least on an experimental basis. The late 1930s and early
1940's saw the first Very High Frequency (VHF) band in use, and Frequency Modu-
lation (FM) was introduced. Continued research and development for military applica-
tions during the Second World War, coupled with the FM and VHF advances,
significantly improved the performance of earlier systems. This stimulated demand for
mobile services.
If the industry grew fast prior to World War II, it was explosive in the post-war era.
Not only did private services expand, but common carrier services were licensed. De-
mand for airwaves to support these new systems reached such a point in the mid-1940's
that the FCC, in Docket 6651, added several new services to the already established
Emergency Radio and Miscellaneous Radio Services. Additionally, the FCC addressed
the question of frequency allocations for land mobile radio by establishing a rulemaking
proceeding, the General Mobile Radio Proceeding (Docket 8658), in 1949.
In the decision arising from Docket 8658, several subcategories of service were re-
cognized, such as Police Radio and Automobile Emergency. By 1950, radio frequencies
had been allocated for public land mobile radio services, private land mobile, mobile
telephone services (on an experimental basis), and public paging services, among others.
Of special interest was the 1949 establishment of special industrial radio, and other ser-
vices which allowed the use of mobile radio to support commercial and industrial appli-
cations. Other subcategories of industrial use followed.
Between 1955 and 1958, land mobile spectrum allocation continued to require a
significant portions of the FCC's time as they struggled to find spectrum for land mobile
radio. This occurred at a time when narrow-band standards were established and Citi-
zens Radio Service rules were revised.
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Docket 1 1991 of 1958 was the next major regulator}' action dealing with land mobile
radio. Under this proceeding, business radio service was established. This provided for
a substantially greater number of eligible licenses.
By the mid-to-late- 1960s, rapid growth in land mobile had again reached a point
where congestion was significantly degrading services, especially in large urban areas.
This prompted the FCC to establish a Spectrum Management Task Force to design a
more efficient system to manage existing land mobile frequencies. Steps were also taken
to investigate various spectrum reallocation proposals in Dockets 18261 and 18262.
In 1968, under Docket 18261, the FCC proposed that the lower seven UHF tele-
vision channels (14-20) in large urban areas be reallocated to land mobile radio. This
was designed to provide immediate relief for mobile radio. The designated channels were
adjacent to an existing land mobile radio allocation, facilitating equipment availability.
The broadcast industry immediately, but unsuccessfully, rose in protest. Two years later
the FCC granted approval for vacant UHF-TV channels in the ten largest mobile radio
markets to be assigned to land mobile. A total of six years had passed from the initial
proposal to a resolution.
Docket 18262 was a related proceeding to decide if spectrum near the 900 MHz
band should be allocated to land mobile. The primary competing service for this band
was the television industry. Also involved with this allocation was the eventual reallo-
cation of UHF-TV channels 70-83 for a total of 84 MHz of spectrum.
The FCC deliberated for seven years before deciding that the public was best served
by use of this band for land mobile rather than broadcasting. This reallocation practi-
cally quadrupled the spectrum available for land mobile radio.
Though the television industry vigorously protested both dockets, the sharing of
UHF-TV channels has presented no interference problems. [Ref. 10 : p. B 42]
From the beginning, growth of mobile radio was rapid. In the space of approxi-
mately sixty years, the industry has grown from one system connected with a few
Detroit police cars to over 3,500 mobile common carriers and just under three million
private land mobile systems [Ref. 9 : pp. 285-287] While the early systems were intended
only for emergency operations, land mobile is now a part of millions of Americans daily
lives. As uses for land mobile have expanded, the governing factor in its development
has been the search, by both the industry and the FCC, for sufficient spectrum to satisfy
this rapid growth. This is not likely to change in the near future, even though mobile
radio has consistently been in the forefront of technological innovation to reduce spec-
trum requirements.
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C. LAND MOBILE RADIO TECHNOLOGY
Radio frequencies most suitable for land mobile radio are to be found in the ap-
proximately 865 MHz spectrum range between 25 and 890 MHz. Lower frequencies in
this range are best for long-range communication, but suffer from occasional noise and
skip problems. Higher frequencies excel for short-range communication. Over the entire
865 MHz spectrum range, more than half of the frequencies not allocated to the federal
government are allocated to the broadcasting industry. [Refs. 15: p. 30, 25: p. 48]
Services and service categories previously mentioned can be placed in one of three
basic types of land mobile radio: paging or one-way signaling, dispatch and mobile
telephone. [Refs. 3: pp. 106-107, 9: pp. 283-284]
Paging provides a one-way signal to a device which alerts the user to take some
action. Simple systems use a tone or vibration, after which the user takes a predeter-
mined action. More sophisticated devices provide the user with an alphanumeric or voice
message which determines subsequent action.
Dispatch communications utilize a two-way (send and receive) radio link between
mobile units and a base station, or simply between mobile units. Communication is ac-
complished without access to public telephone networks. Normally, dispatch communi-
cation is used to coordinate a fleet of vehicles, such as taxis or police cars.
The primary difference between dispatch and mobile telephone services is the ability
of the mobile phone user to receive or place calls through a telephone exchange. The
service is equivalent to regular phone service. Indeed, in some areas and countries this
is exactly how it is used, except that the phone is carried in a vehicle or on a person's
body. The most familiar application is cellular phones.
Any of these services can be provided by a private or common carrier, on a shared
or exclusive basis. A private system allows the user to be independently licensed, and
equipment (leased or owned) is used on an exclusive basis. A shared system, as the name
implies, allows several users to share the use and cost of a system. Service provided by
a common carrier (such as AT&T) means that the base station, repeaters and other fa-
cilities, are owned by the carrier. Service is leased to users. The carrier may also rent
mobile units or they may be owned by the subscriber.
While the spectral implications of FCC Docket 18262 to the 900 MHz band have
been discussed, it also has consequences for the technological use of this band. From
competing proposals, three system classes emerged: conventional, trunked and cellular.
[Refs. 3: pp. 115-118, 9: p. 287]
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The conventional mobile radio system is the most common type of service. The
simplest example of a conventional system would be a private, single-channel dispatch
service. More complicated conventional systems can include multiple channels. The en-
tire system would consist of a base station, including the transmitter-receiver
(transceiver) and antenna, and the individual mobile transceivers. The base station could
be located either at the business site or remotely, for better coverage (such as on a tall
building or mountain). The channel used might be shared with other businesses using a
similar system. If a larger area of coverage is required, then the system might incorporate
repeaters located at high elevations away from the base station. A repeater would receive
a signal on one frequency, from either the base station or mobile transceiver, and re-
transmit it using a second frequency. A repeater can normally receive and transmit over
a large area. This enables low-powered mobiles to communicate with each other through
the repeater, as long as both are within line-of-sight of the repeater. Without a repeater,
these mobiles might not be able to communicate directly with each other, even if only
a few miles apart.
A multi-channel trunked system uses a group of channels (usually five or more
channel pairs) pooled together. Users have access to all channels. In a multi-channel
trunked system, switching between channels is handled by a computer. In contrast,
multi-channel conventional systems use manual rather than computer-controlled chan-
nel selection. The advantage of computer-controlled channel switching is better service
for users, or a greater volume of traffic for the same level of service.
The computer provides a channel for the duration of a user's message. If there are
no unused channels, the computer places the user in a queue for the next available
channel. The efficiency of trunking over conventional systems can be visualized by con-
sidering a collection of conventional systems. At any one time, some of these channels
will be heavily used, while others are lightly loaded. Trunking provides the opportunity
to distribute the message load equitably over an entire group of channels. While it is
obvious that trunking is more spectrally efficient than conventional systems, trunking is
used only in the 900 MHz band due to assignment regulations and a lack of sufficient
channels in other bands to support trunking.
The third system class to emerge from the FCC proceeding was cellular. The 900
MHz band was particularly suitable for cellular because of its short propagation
characteristics.
Cellular derives its name from a concept first advocated by AT&T. Geographic
areas are divided into hexagonal cells. This cell shape was chosen because it roughly
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approximates a circle surrounding a base station. Furthermore, a hex, unlike a circle, can
be joined with other hexes to completely define coverage of an area. A transmitter and
receiver are located in each cell. They are connected by wirelines to a central switching
computer. The central computer is then connected to the regular telephone network by
other wirelines.
The cell receivers and transmitters are designed to provide coverage for that cell
only. However, signals must be strong enough to cover the entire cell, so there is na-
turally some frequency bleed-over into adjacent cells. This precludes the use of the same
frequency in adjacent cells but not in cells further away.
In a low density market, or initial installation of a cell, the cell area can be quite
large. As demand for cellular service increases
,
the cell can be subdivided into smaller
cells. With a large cell, a channel will be used only once. As the large cell is subdivided
into smaller cells, that same channel may be used numerous times in the same area where
it was previously used only once. This depends, of course, on the separation of the cells
in which this frequency is being reused. Whereas a conventional system may preclude the
reuse of a channel over an entire metropolitan area, cellular allows reuse of that channel
within the same area.
The advantage is spectral efficiency. As more users demand service, they are ac-
commodated without an increase in frequencies required. Trunking can further increase
spectral efficiency. Future economies of the spectrum are currently envisioned by cou-
pling a cellular system with digital processes or spread spectrum techniques.
While services traditionally have been provided by equipment mounted in vehicles,
advances in sold-state electronics have now produced devices small enough to be carried
by a person.
D. ALLOCATION AND ASSIGNMENT MECHANISMS
Land mobile radio did not exist when the Radio Act of 1927 was enacted. Therefore,
spectrum allocation for this service has been subject only to the criteria of public need.
Unfortunately, that portion of the spectrum best suited for land mobile is also well suited
for other uses, especially broadcasting. Thus, land mobile must compete with these other
uses in the arena of public interest. The rapid and continuing growth of land mobile has
placed demands upon the FCC for allocation. In all probability, this will continue. More
than any other service, land mobile has consistently demanded increased spectrum. As
bands have been allocated, channels have been loaded to capacity as fast as the Com-
mission has assigned them. [Ref. 10: pp. 53-54]
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1. Historical
Until the mid-1930's, land mobile allocation was made only on an experimental
basis; assignment was restricted to police departments. The mid-1930's saw the first
non-experimental allocation of land mobile as other uses for the service were realized.
In the late 1930s, the frequencies allocated to land mobile, and services which would
become land mobile, were extended as equipment technology progressed. [Ref. 10 : pp.
B 7-B 9]
The first coherent apportionment of the spectrum usable by land mobile began
in 1944. By 1949, the Commission had established the allocation policy for land mobile
that more or less exists today. This decision was based on estimates of what existing
services would need for future growth. Approximately 60 percent of the 25-890 MHz
band was reserved for broadcasting uses, 34 percent was retained by the government
(exclusive and shared use), and the remaining six to seven percent of the spectrum was
to be divided among aviation, maritime, amateur, citizens, and land mobile services. Of
this six to seven percent, land mobile received about four point seven percent. Failure
to predict the phenomenal growth which has occurred in land mobile accounted for this
relative imbalance in allocation. [Ref. 25: pp. 48-49]
2. Current
Admission into many land mobile services has historically been practically un-
inhibited for eligible applicants. Operators in services such as business and land trans-
port radio were allowed to enter their respective bands knowing full well that their entry
would very likely cause interference for others on various frequencies. [Ref. 15: p. 30]
Block assignment compounds the problem of uninhibited admission. Used since
the early days of land mobile, blocks of frequencies are allocated for the various services.
Requirements are then set for entry into the band. Because of the large number of ser-
vices desiring use of the spectrum, blocks allocated to each service are small. Assignment
must be on a shared basis for licensees within each allocated block. In contrast to
broadcast service, where exclusive use of a particular channel is granted to one licensee,
land mobile services do not limit the number of licensees permitted to operate on each
channel. If the number of frequencies is greater than the number of users, this system
works well. However, this is rarely the case. Therefore, a system of licensing and fre-
quency selection has emerged. [Ref. 25: p. 50]
While the FCC actually issues licenses for all land mobile services, voluntary
industry advisory committees, commonly known as frequency coordinators, play a sig-
nificant role in the assignment process. These coordinators recommend assignments and
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sharing arrangements for users in virtually all mobile radio services. They also resolve
interference complaints. Reliance on frequency coordinators is designed to reduce delays
in processing applications, encourage sharing and ease the introduction of new
technologies. [Rcf. 9: pp. 287-288, 15 : p. 3 1 J
E. ESTABLISHING A MARKET IN LAND MOBILE RADIO
While mechanisms exist to ensure an efficient utilization of land mobile radio, the
questions must be asked: would the establishment of a marketplace for these services not
achieve the same or even more advantageous benefits? What would such a market look
like and how would it operate? Lastly, to what extent could this system be extended to
other uses of the spectrum?
A simple, yet practical trial market could be established in order to test these con-
cepts and derive at least partial answers. Utilizing the present FCC allocation scheme
or an auction system, a channel or group of channels could be designated from the re-
serve spectrum. If reserve spectrum is used, it would not affect any bands currently in
use. If this is not the case, the current FCC allocation scheme would be used so as not
to conflict with other bands.
Assignment would be by a sealed bid auction. All participants in the auction would
still be required to show the currently required financial, technical and social documen-
tation for access to a band. That is, bidders must meet standards of current licenses. The
highest bidder would gain control of the band. No right of renewal is anticipated, since
as long as the band is being utilized by the initial owner, he retains control. If the owner
does not use the band, then it becomes open for auction again. However, before allowing
the band to go unused, and thereby losing the initial investment, the owner is more likely
to attempt to lease or sell the band.
Economic efficiency will come from the current owner's ability to transfer spectral
rights to other persons or organizations, subject to meeting license standards. No other
restrictions concerning transfers should be imposed. The incumbent would be free to sell
or lease all or portions of the assigned band. The current owner would likely transfer
rights when it is more economically efficient than retaining the band for his own use.
That is, a new user who values the band more highly will be willing to pay the incumbent
user more than what the incumbent could reap from his own use of the band. Likewise,
spectral efficiency would be enhanced if the cost of new spectrum saving equipment is
less than what could be earned by selling or leasing the spectrum thus saved. These
benefits would accrue because a price would now be associated with the spectrum.
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Problems associated with "free spectrum" would disappear in bands where a monetary
cost is established.
The only service restriction imposed by the FCC would be that the band could be
used only for mobile radio. No technical standards would be imposed, the owner would
be free to utilize any system deemed to best utilize the spectrum assigned. The user
would be responsible for choosing technical standards which do not cause interference
to other systems. That is, the incumbent's property rights must not infringe upon the
property rights of others. If interference occurs, it will be the financial responsibility of
the offender to remove the source of interference by reconfiguring either his own system
or the system which is being interfered with. For simplicity, the last user to begin utiliz-
ing the spectrum could be considered the cause of interference.
The government's role, other than initial allocation and assignment by auction,
would be to enforce property rights in cases involving interference. All other duties
normally performed by the FCC, such as technical standards and reassignment, would
be handled by the owners working within the marketplace.
Although the spectrum would now have owners, at least in those bands opened for
market exploitation, it would not be lost to the people as a national asset. In fact,
ownership would ensure that the national asset is used more efficiently. Ownership en-
sures that the highest valued users have access to the resource. Any time a portion of
the spectrum is no longer used, it would automatically return to the government to be
held in trust or reauctioned as appropriate. The government would also retain the right
to purchase the spectrum, under eminent domain, if necessary for national security or
emergency measures.
Lastly, to what extent should a spectrum market extend? Should all portions of the
usable spectrum be included, or only portions currently used or planned for use by des-
ignated services, such as Land Mobile Radio Services? Arguments have been made for
both positions. The answer depends upon the advocate's belief in the efficacy of eco-
nomic solutions. However, in the interest of practicality, such as reducing resistance to
change, only portions of the spectrum used by services like land mobile radio would in-
itially be open to a market. At least at first, the FCC would continue to exercise the
controls now established for industries such as broadcasting. This is particularly impor-
tant in view of the social implications associated with such businesses. Like so many
other issues, the extent of the market should be the result of extensive discussion and
compromise, perhaps based on the results of a marketplace trial.
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F. CONCLUSIONS
The development of the Land Mobile Radio Services has been significantly influ-
enced by the FCC and the users themselves. Many issues have not been resolved. Prob-
lems of congestion and allocation are a recurrent theme in land mobile. Several means
have been used to resolve these problems: technological advances, spectrum reallocation
and sharing frequencies. Technologically, land mobile has decreased the amount of
spectrum needed to carry an intelligible signal and developed equipment which allows
use of the spectrum at higher and higher frequencies. Users have also sought to wrest
spectrum allocated to other services, both occupied and unoccupied. Barring total real-
location, they have attempted to share those frequencies which are currently
underutilized.
These latter two avenues have often brought land mobile into conflict with the
broadcast industry. The competition between land mobile and the broadcast industry
concerning the UHF band is far from over. Even with these problems, the industry has
grown at an explosive rate. This is not likely to change, especially with the current in-
terest in cellular communications. Mobile radio will become more important, not less,
to the economic health of the United States.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The telecommunications industry is an essential component of the U.S.
infrastructure; as important to economic growth as roads, rails and waterways. With this
thought in mind, there are at least two reasons why our status as an economic power is
in jeopardy. First, an expensive, slow and often arbitrary system of spectrum allocation
is gradually causing the loss of our technological edge in electronics based communi-
cation products. Second, the scarcity of frequencies for commercial use has impeded the
development and commercialization of new telecommunications products and services,
and reduced the capacity and efficiency of our telecommunications systems.
There is little doubt that the availability of additional spectrum for commercial
purposes would promote the emergence of new industries, create new products and ser-
vices for consumers, and provide additional jobs in emerging industries and services.
Additionally, an extension of the spectrum would also help improve America's interna-
tional competitiveness in telecommunications markets, since nations and businesses
which first commercialize new technologies tend to gain significant advantages in inter-
national markets.
However, since the radio frequency spectrum is a finite resource which can not be
infinitely extended, the problem becomes obtaining the maximum use from the available
spectrum. A feasible method to quickly achieve this objective would entail substantial
changes from the current government regulatory method in the allocation, assignment
and management of the frequency spectrum.
Under the current administrative scheme, several negative characteristics, both
within and outside the system, prevent maximum occupancy of the spectrum:
• Delay.
Generally, allocation occurs only after long delay (as occurred in Dockets
18261 and 18262) because an atmosphere of inadequate or unavailable information
typifies the Commission. Given this situation, it is easy to understand these delays
as an indication of the Commission's desire to avoid allocation mistakes. Delay also
is a manifestation of the spectrum's free good aspect (price set to zero). Under this
situation, demand almost always exceeds supply. Therefore, the Commission must
decide between numerous competing claimants using a criteria of "need" for the
service. The difficulty and delays encountered in this system are readily apparent.
• Inflexibility.
Often, the Commission has been reluctant to reallocate spectrum even when it
is obvious that allocated spectrum was not being used extensively or as efficiently
as possible. This may be a result of the human trait of not wishing to admit
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mistakes, or a belief that soon, the allocation will prove correct. Another likely
reason is that spectrum incumbents exert political pressures on the Commission in
order to retain current allocation decisions.
• Bias against innovation.
The politics and bureaucracy of spectrum management also hinder technolog-
ical innovation. Incumbent users tend to control technology and are loathe to in-
troduce new technology before capital investment in previous equipment has been
recovered, or until forced to do so by competitors. Free spectrum also provides
little incentive for efficient use.
Whereas the Commission's original purpose was to remove policy from the political
realm and entrust it to the hands of experts, this concept has not been totally realized,
especially as it relates to politics. Likewise, a judicial regulatory bottleneck prevents
wider and more efficient use of benefits available from the spectrum.
Rapid changes in the telecommunications climate requires the revaluation of the
government's role in order to eliminate, or at least reduce, the effects of negative attri-
butes. Yesterday's institutional arrangements have lost and will continue to lose rele-
vance in the face of technical and commercial requirements. The imposition of a
managerial system dating back to 1934 has hampered the introduction of new technol-
ogy, such as occurred with cellular services.
At the time, the FCC's inception and institution was not necessarily an erroneous
or bad idea. In a static world with little innovation and a clear understanding of the de-
mands which will be placed upon the spectrum-conditions which were thought to exist
in the early decades of this century—a bureaucracy is probably adequate to satisfy the
desires of airwave consumers. But in a dynamic world, characterized by innovation and
uncertainty regarding demand-the world which we now live in--a market would seem to
offer distinct advantages in allowing consumers to utilize the spectrum to their greatest
advantage.
The deficiencies of the current system are generally viewed as failings which can be
rectified by legislation or other means, rather than by introducing a substantially revised
system. Yet a new system incorporating elements of a market, to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, may be a better answer.
A spectral market would manage the airwaves much as the federal government now
does: it would determine where, how and by whom the resource shall be used, though
these determinations would be made using market prices. It would also take into account
prevailing and emerging engineering factors, and social goals and priorities promoted by
Congress and society at large. A major difference, however, of a market as opposed to
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a bureaucratic system of regulation is that the former would tend to be more responsive
to the decisions of individual users. A spectrum manager attempts to distribute spectral
rights like a market, but limitations of knowledge necessarily result in different patterns.
The establishment of property rights associated with the spectrum in a market system
would allow the user to chose his own frequency (within a band), bandwidth, and mod-
ulation technique.
While this may be seen as forcing the obsolescence of previous systems and thus
ultimately devaluing the spectrum, that situation is not likely to occur. The value of the
radio frequency spectrum is dependent upon not only the ability to transmit, but also
the ability to receive information. Therefore, similar systems will either advance apace
or at least remain compatible. As to whether a market would, in fact, accelerate tech-
nological innovation, it is not certain. But, that innovation under government control
has not proceeded as quickly as possible is a fact. One reason for this is that under
government input specifications and licenses, there is a cost for new equipment but no
attendant increase in the value of the rights associated with the spectrum. The user has
no incentive to adopt new techniques. However, if a system is imposed whereby the in-
crease in value of the spectrum is enjoyed by the innovator, the motivation is clear: if the
value exceeds the cost, the new technology will be adopted.
Yet, in the final analysis there is no perfect method of spectrum management. Just
as clearly, however, there exists a need for some form of management, if for no other
reason than to prevent the airwaves from dissolving into chaos.
These two statements form the essential question: what is the least imperfect
method? In economic terms, this would be the system which utilizes the scarce resource
optimally. As I've attempted to explain, this is best achieved through a market mech-
anism. However, market-type efficiency considerations may not be enough in managing
the spectrum. Maintaining safety, internal and external security, education and cultural
values, and the Orwellian implications of mass communications are also important as-
pects which must be kept in mind. While a full-fledged market would have advantages,
at least in theory, a regulated market-type system may be more practical and
appropriate.
Given this situation, a combination of market incentives and bureaucratic control
might be the least imperfect method of regulation. A clear separation of market and
government control would certainly be the easiest system to establish and control. For
example, the government could control broadcasting (to further social goals) while fixed
and mobile services would be left to the marketplace. While this is the simplest method,
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it denies the advantages of the market to the segment of the spectrum occupied by
broadcasting.
The proposal recommended here, not as easily instituted or regulated, seeks to
combine the best aspects of each system. In this hybrid system, advantages of the market
(innovation, efficiency, personal choice, property rights) would be combined with those
of bureaucratic regulation (security, safety, social progress). For example, services pro-
moting safety and security would be completely regulated. These would include mari-
time, aviation, fire, police, ambulance services and the like. These bands would retain a
"free" price for allocation and assignment by the government. These services are not
expected to be profitable ventures, and as such would be at a disadvantage if forced to
bid for the airwaves against businesses operating for profit. Utilizing the example of a
national park again, the special uses to which a park has been set aside, as opposed to
other parcels of land, allow it to be retained for the enjoyment of all the public, at little
or not cost. Likewise, the special uses of safety and security services for the general
welfare of the public would argue for the same consideration.
Likewise, while broadcasting is a profitable business, strictly economic allocations
and assignments might not achieve social and cultural aspects deemed beneficial by our
society. Therefore, while control of the spectrum may be a strictly economic process, the
actual occupancy of those same airwaves could be made to meet established standards.
In this way, efficiency can be attained while other goals are also met. Market control
over the spectrum must be granted to broadcasters, regardless of whether permission to
use the airwaves for the transmission of programs is given based on social concerns. In
this way, transfers of unused spectrum may be made to those desiring access or more
spectrum. This leaves that segment of the radio frequency spectrum occupied by fixed
and mobile services, which are not accounted for by the safety, security or broadcast
services. It is here that the utility of the marketplace is evidenced. Here, government
regulation should be relegated to the protection of property rights.
As proposed earlier, the FCC could attempt a limited marketplace experiment for
this latter category by making a specific band available. The information gained would
be valuable in determining the efficacy of an extension of the program, that is, whether
the advantages of defined property rights outweigh the costs of defining and enforcing
them.
In conjunction with this approach, a separate category of service should be estab-
lished. In addition to fixed, mobile and broadcasting, an "emerging technology" service
should be established in which spectrum is devoted entirely to new technologies being
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developed. This, of course, would not represent any fixed band, but would evolve as
necessary. Benefits could be incalculable, based on the previous discussion of national
and international benefits. In one sense, the introduction ofnew management techniques
could also be interpreted as belonging to this experimental band. Not only could a
marketplace experiment be used, but other innovative management ideas tried which
might hold significant consequences.
Along with this new spectral management system, two other aspects of the current
system should be discarded. First is the national allocation procedure. National allo-
cation should give way to regional allocation, where propagation characteristics permit.
This would promote the re-use of spectrum within the same band when geographic sep-
aration is sufficient. This is known as frequency sharing.
Frequency sharing also relates to the second item: sharing of government owned
spectrum. Whereas this paper has been confined to non-government uses of the spec-
trum under U.S. control, the fact remains that approximately 40 percent of the spectrum
is reserved for government use. Many of those frequencies are unused [Ref. 19]. There
is, in many cases, no reason some of these frequencies can not be allocated or at least
shared with commercial users. While the specter of national security is often raised at
this suggestion, the implementation of appropriate technology to shared or leased bands
would ensure that frequencies could be quickly reclaimed by the government as needed.
In the meantime, valuable contributions from these frequencies could be obtained within
the marketplace. Not only could the federal government receive revenues from this cur-
rent wasteland, but in a manner, the economic use of these frequencies can be said to
contribute more to our national defense when they are released to the market than while
going unused, given the advantages which spectral innovation can achieve on the do-
mestic and international scene.
In conclusion, a reevaluation of the government's role in radio frequency spectrum
management must be made. Whether this reassessment recognizes the advantages of a
marketplace system may or may not be crucial. Yet, given the pace of today's techno-
logical developments, our present regulatory system has and will continue to lose rele-
vance, and indeed, is slowing the introduction of innovation.
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